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Credit default swaps 
Financial innovation or ﬁ  nancial dysfunction?
SATYAJIT DAS
Risk Consultant
CDS contracts were originally designed to transfer and disperse default risk within the capital markets 
to strengthen the resilience of ﬁ   nancial institutions. The Global Financial Crisis has revealed that 
CDS contracts may not in fact achieve these objectives and may in fact increase the leverage within 
the system and also increase systemic risks in other ways. Documentary complexity, counterparty risk 
and increased concentration risk, brought about by CDS contracts, have contributed to the crisis and 
made it difﬁ  cult to deal with key issues. CDS contracts may be presented as an important ﬁ  nancial 
innovation, but actually are a major ﬁ  nancial dysfunction and a cause of risk within ﬁ  nancial system under 
certain circumstances.
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C
redit default swap (CDS) contracts and 
credit derivatives are complex and powerful 
ﬁ  nancial instruments that frequently have 
unforeseen consequences for market participants 
and the ﬁ  nancial system. As former New York 
Federal Reserve President Gerald Corrigan told 
policy-makers and ﬁ   nanciers on 16 May, 2007: 
“Anyone who thinks they understand this stuff is 
living in lala land.”
1| THE PROTECTION RACKET 1
In a typical CDS contract, the buyer of protection 
transfers the risk of default of a borrower (the 
reference entity) to a protection seller who for a 
fee indemniﬁ  es the protection buyer against credit 
losses. The buyer of protection is hedging the risk 
of default of the reference entity while the seller 
of protection is assuming the risk of default of the 
reference entity.
For the buyer of protection, the CDS contract avoids 
the need to transfer loans or bonds to hedge the 
credit risk of the issuer or borrower. This may be 
useful for illiquid bonds and especially loans, where 
it may be difﬁ  cult to transfer the debt without the 
consent of the borrower. It allows disaggregation of 
key elements in hedging credit risk such as timing of 
the hedge, maturity of the hedge, currency in which 
the hedge is transacted and the pricing of the hedge. 
This increases ﬂ  exibility in hedging credit risk. The 
documentation for CDS contracts is less expensive 
and less complicated relative to that needed for 
selling or transferring a loan. The transfer of the 
risk of a loan can be completed without disclosure 
to the ultimate borrower. This is possible as the loan 
is not sold or transferred but hedged through the 
separate CDS transaction.
For the seller of protection, the CDS contracts allows 
entities other than traditional ﬁ  nancial institutions 
with lack of credit origination infrastructure to 
participate relatively easily in the credit market. The 
CDS contract, being off-balance sheet and unfunded, 
allows a seller of protection to take positions in 
credit markets on a leveraged basis; that is, without 
investing the full face value of the loan or bond.
The CDS contract facilitates short selling credit risk. 
This overcomes structural issues, such as the illiquid 
nature of the corporate bond repo market, that make 
it difﬁ  cult, in practice, to short sell credit risk. The 
volume of CDS contracts is also unconstrained 
by the available amount of the reference entity’s 
outstanding bonds and loans potentially increasing 
the overall liquidity of credit markets.
The CDS contract and the entire structured credit 
market were predicated originally on hedging of credit 
risk. Over time, the market has changed focus – in 
Mae West’s words: “I used to be Snow White, but I drifted.” 
The ability to short credit, leverage positions, 
and trade credit unrestricted by the size of the 
underlying debt market have become the dominant 
drivers of growth in the market for these instruments. 
At the market peak in volume around 2007, CDS volumes 
were estimated to be roughly three to four times 
volumes of underlying bonds or loans. This reﬂ  ects 
increased interest amongst investors, such as hedge 
funds, in trading credit risk.
2| OUNCES OF PERFORMANCE
Where banks use CDS contracts to hedge credit risk, the 
key issue is whether the contract protects the banks from 
the underlying credit risk being hedged. As Mae West 
also noted: “An ounce of performance is worth pounds 
of promises”. Documentation and counterparty risk 
means that the market may not function as participants 
and regulators hope if actual defaults occur. 
Over time, CDS documentation has become highly 
standardised to facilitate trading. It generally does not 
exactly match the terms of the underlying credit 
risk (for example, the bond or loan) being hedged. 
A CDS contract is only likely to be a close hedge 
to another position in an offsetting CDS contract. 
CDS contracts are also technically complex in relation 
to the identity of the entity being hedged, the events 
that are covered and how the CDS contract is to be 
settled. This means that the hedge may not provide, 
in practice, the protection sought. In fairness, 
all ﬁ  nancial hedges display some degree of mismatch 
or “basis” risk.2
1  For a more technical treatment of CDS contracts see Satyajit Das (2005).
2  For a discussion of documentary issues in CDS contracts see Satyajit Das (2008 and 2009).
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In 2009, the International Swap Dealers Association 
(ISDA), the industry lobby group with little regulatory 
or legal status, implemented the “hardwire” of the 
CDS contract, creating a Credit Determinations 
Committee (CDC) to deal with some of these issues. 
The CDC, made up of ISDA members, primarily 
dealers but now also including investors and other 
market participants, is charged with “determining” 
whether a credit event has occurred or a successor 
event has taken place and establishing the framework 
for settling contracts. 
This curious development has real world 
consequences. In 2010, ISDA’s American CDC voted 
that a bankruptcy credit event had occurred in respect 
of Ambac Assurance Corporation, which provided 
ﬁ   nancial guarantee insurance for public and structured 
ﬁ  nance obligations. Interestingly, Ambac Assurance 
had not actually ﬁ  led for bankruptcy protection. 
The insurer was seeking to restructure its operation. 
The credit event was classed as a ‘bankruptcy’ credit 
event, rather than alternatives such as ‘restructuring’ 
or ‘failure to pay’ due to complex provision of the 
CDS governing documentation. The case highlights 
the complexity and (sometimes) unintended 
consequences of CDS documentation, which 
moreover are poorly understood.
At the quantum level, the laws of classical physics 
bend in intriguing ways. In the case of CDS contracts, 
at the derivative level, the rules of ﬁ  nance also 
operate differently.
3| WHO’S HEDGING WHOM?
CDS contracts substitute the risk of the protection 
seller for the risk of the loan or bond being hedged. 
If the seller of protection is unable to perform then 
the buyer obtains no protection.
In many cases, the CDS is marked-to-market daily 
and any gain or loss is covered by collateral (cash 
or high quality securities) to minimise performance 
risk. If there is a failure to meet a margin call then 
the position must be closed out and the collateral 
applied against the loss. 
AIG’s CDS contract were subject to the provision 
that if the ﬁ  rm was downgraded below AA- then the 
ﬁ  rm would have to post collateral. In October 2008, 
when AIG was downgraded below the nominated 
threshold, this triggered a collateral call rumoured to 
be around USD 14 billion. AIG did not have the cash 
to meet this call and ultimately required government 
support. 
Current derivative market reform proposals 
requires standardised derivative transactions, 
including CDS contracts, to be cleared through the 
central counterparty (CCP). The CCP guarantees 
performance and manages the credit risk of 
derivative transactions. However, there are reasons 
to be cautious about the efﬁ  cacy of the CCP.
The CCP risk management process requires liquid 
markets and reliable market prices that may not 
be available. Few derivatives will be capable of 
being marked-to-market against actual prices. For 
CDS contracts, it may be mark-to-model based on 
inputs that may be validated from market prices. 
For less traded reference entities, it will be a case of 
mark-to-make-believe or mark-to-myself. One market 
participant described quotes for CDS contracts in the 
following terms: “The business looks like the window 
of a Brezhnev-era Soviet butcher shop. Mouldy 
scraps hanging in the window. Old women lining up 
at 4am to try and buy credit protection on General 
Motors. What are reported as trades are really ways 
to establish prices to satisfy the auditors.”3  
CCP risk management relies on establishing a level 
of initial margin to secure performance. Margins 
will be based on historical price movements using 
value-at-risk and stress models that performed 
poorly during recent times. For CDS contracts that 
are triggered by defaults, unexpected and rapid 
deterioration in the credit condition of an entity 
can trigger large changes in value – known as “jump 
to default” risk. Such rapid changes in value are 
difﬁ  cult to model and capture in risk management 
systems. If initial margins are too low, then the 
CCP is inadequately protected against counterparty 
default. Alternatively, the initial margin may be set 
too high creating disincentives for legitimate risk 
management activity.
3  See John Dizard (2008).
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Where a margin payment is not met, the mechanics 
of closeout assume the ability to replace the defaulted 
contract with a new counterparty at current market 
prices in an active and liquid market. In the aftermath 
of the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy ﬁ  ling, market 
liquidity diminished sharply and price volatility 
increased. It was practically difﬁ  cult  to  replace 
CDS contracts. Market prices and valuations were 
signiﬁ  cantly different from model valuations. It is not 
clear how these risks will be managed by the CCP.
In its December 2009 report “Reforming OTC 
derivative markets: a UK perspective”, the 
UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) did not 
support mandatory clearing because “the clearing of 
all standardised derivatives could lead to a situation 
where a …CCP… is required to clear a product it is not 
able to risk manage adequately, with the potential for 
serious difﬁ  culties in the event of a default.”
4| FINANCIAL DYSFUNCTION
Financial innovation can offer economic beneﬁ  ts. 
CDS contracts may help complete markets, 
enhancing investment and borrowing opportunities, 
reducing transaction costs and allowing risk transfer. 
CDS contracts, where used for hedging, offers these 
advantages. Where not used for hedging, it is not 
clear how this assists in capital formation and 
enhancing efﬁ  ciency of markets. 
In providing the ability to transfer risk, CDS contracts 
may in turn encourage moral hazard in institutions 
encouraging them to take on more risk on the 
assumption that the additional risk will be 
transferred or hedged. It exposes ﬁ  rms to signiﬁ  cant 
risk of losses from a breakdown in markets and also 
where the hedges do not work as intended due 
to either problems in the design of the hedge or 
counterparty risk. 
It is generally assumed that speculative interest 
assists in enhancing liquidity and lowers trading 
costs. Where the liquidity comes from leveraged 
investors, the additional systemic risk from the 
activity of these entities has to be balanced against 
potential beneﬁ  ts. 
Pricing of CDS contracts frequently does not accord with 
reasonable expected risk of default. The CDS prices, 
in practice, incorporate substantial liquidity premia, 
compensation for volatility of credit spreads and 
other factors.  CDS pricing also frequently does not 
align with pricing of other traded credit instruments 
such as bonds or loans. 
The “negative basis trade” is predicated on 
pricing inefﬁ  ciency. In a negative basis transaction 
commonly undertaken by investors including 
insurance companies, the investor purchases a bond 
issued by the reference entity and hedges the 
credit risk by buying protection on the issuer using 
a CDS contract. The transaction is designed to lock in 
a positive margin between the earnings on the bond 
and CDS fees. Negative basis trades exploit market 
inefﬁ  ciencies in the pricing of credit risk between 
bond and CDS markets.
Beneﬁ  ts of CDS contracts must be balanced against 
any additional systemic risks from trading in these 
instruments. CDS contracts may amplify losses 
through leverage and increase credit risk within 
the ﬁ  nancial system as well as change the risk of 
bankruptcy and affect the level of recoveries.
5| SEND ME A CHILD OF FIVE!
Discussions of “losses” always lead to arguments that 
approximate Groucho Marx: “A child of ﬁ  ve would 
understand this. Send someone to fetch a child of ﬁ  ve.”
The derivative industry’s indefatigable support of the 
market centres on the fact that all the CDS contracts 
related to the high proﬁ  le defaults in the global 
ﬁ  nancial crisis settled and the overall net settlement 
amounts were small. 
Closer scrutiny suggests caution. In practice, until 
the implementation of the “hardwire” in 2009 there 
are actually two settlements. The “real” settlement 
where genuine hedgers and investors deliver bonds 
under the physical settlement rules (i.e. those who 
actually own bonds or loans and were hedging). Then 
there is the parallel universe where the dealers and 
large hedge funds settled via the auction. Dealers 
tend to have small net positions (large sold and 
bought protection but overall reasonably matched). 
In the case of Lehman Brothers, the net settlement 
ﬁ  gure of USD 6 billion that is frequently quoted 
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refers to the second process. Real CDS losses 
from Lehman CDSs were higher, probably around 
USD 300-400 billion. Some banks and investors that 
had sold protection on Lehmans did not participate in 
the auction. They chose to take delivery of defaulted 
Lehman debt resulting in losses of almost the entire 
face value. For example, one German Landesbank 
reportedly took delivery of USD 1 billion of Lehman 
bonds that were worth USD 30 million at current 
market values.
CDS contracts did, in all probability, amplify losses 
in the credit market in recent defaults. For example, 
when Lehman Brothers defaulted the ﬁ  rm had 
around USD 600 billion in debt. This would have 
been the maximum loss to creditors in the case 
of default. According to market estimates, there 
were CDS contracts of around USD 400-500 billion 
where Lehmans was the reference entity. If used 
for hedging, then the CDS contracts would merely 
have resulted in the losses to creditors being 
transferred to the sellers of protection leaving the 
total loss unchanged. Market estimates suggest that 
only around USD 150 billion of the CDS contracts 
were hedges. The remaining USD 250-350 billion 
of CDS contracts were not hedging underlying 
debt. The losses on these CDS contracts (in excess 
of USD 200-300 billion) are additional to the 
USD 600 billion. 
Proponents of CDS contracts argue that losses on 
additional “speculative” positions on Lehman as 
a reference entity are not a loss per se; that is, there 
are no “real” losses. Instead, the argument goes 
that they represent a transfer of payments from 
one counterparty to another – from the seller of 
protection to the buyer of protection. The idea is 
evident in a short essay by Michel de Montaigne 
entitled “That one man’s proﬁ  t is another’s loss”. 
Interestingly, if you follow that logic with Lehman’s 
debt then nobody actually lost money either because 
somebody somewhere must have made it on the 
other side. Indeed, there have been no losses at all 
during the entire Global Financial Crisis as someone 
somewhere has made the offsetting gain.
The true issue is subtler — the CDS contracts 
ampliﬁ  ed the losses as a result of the bankruptcy of 
Lehmans by (up to) approximately 50%. It increases 
the embedded leverage in the ﬁ  nancial system to 
a speciﬁ  c event namely the default of the reference 
entity. It also may absorb available liquidity and 
capital creating systemic issues.
6| CHAIN LETTERS
The CDS market entails complex chains of risk 
similar to the re-insurance chains that proved so 
problematic in the case of the Lloyds market. The 
transfer of risk assumes that all parties along the 
potential chain perform their contracts. Any failure in 
the chain of risk transfer exposes other parties to the 
risk of insolvency and default. Defaults and failures 
in CDS contracts may quickly cause the ﬁ  nancial 
system to become “gridlocked” as uncertainty about 
counterparty risks restricts normal trading. The 
bankruptcy of Lehmans set off a chain of just these 
events causing ﬁ  nancial markets to become “frozen” 
in September and October 2008.
As in the re-insurance market, the long chain of 
CDS contracts may create unknown concentration 
risks. Derivatives markets generally may have 
higher concentration risk than considered 
desirable or acceptable. The CDS market is similar 
in structure to the overall derivative market with 
less than 10 dealers having the major share of the 
market. The potential impact of a bankruptcy ﬁ  ling 
by Bear Stearns and AIG on the OTC derivatives 
market, including CDS contracts, was probably one 
of the factors that inﬂ  uenced the Federal Reserve 
and US Treasury’s decision to support the rescue of 
the two ﬁ  rms. 
If the CDS contracts fail then “hedged” banks are 
exposed to losses on the underlying credit risk. 
One analyst suggested that losses from failure 
of CDS protection sellers to perform could total 
between USD 33 billion and USD 158 billion.4 
Barclays Capital estimated that the failure of a dealer 
with USD 2 trillion in CDS contracts outstanding 
could potentially lead to losses of between 
USD 36 billion and USD 47 billion for counterparties. 
This underlines the potential concentration risks 
that are present. 
CDS contracts may under certain circumstances 
create volatility and uncertainty instead of reducing 
4  See Andrea Cicione (2008).
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risk. For example, the coupling of participants 
and long chains of risk transfer may mean that 
uncertainty about the ﬁ  nancial position or solvency 
of any ﬁ  rm is quickly transmitted throughout the 
ﬁ  nancial system rather than being conﬁ  ned to ﬁ  rms 
directly exposed to the distressed entity. Attempts to 
hedge this risk or close out positions may increase 
volatility. There are also negative feedback loops. 
If reference entities start to default then insurers, 
hedge funds and banks are affected. If the economic 
climate worsens and defaults rise then the overall 
ability to rely on these hedges may decline. The 
extent of the diversiﬁ  cation of risk may diminish 
exactly when it is most needed.
7| WAS IT GOOD FOR YOU TOO?
The documentation of CDS contract may also 
increase the risk of bankruptcy and impede debt 
restructuring that would limit losses from ﬁ  nancial 
distress.
In 2008, CDS contracts on Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae) and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or 
Freddie Mac) were triggered as a result of the 
“conservatorship”. This may seem odd given the 
government actions were speciﬁ  cally designed to 
allow Fannie and Freddie to continue fully honouring 
their obligations. However, “conservatorship” 
is speciﬁ  cally included within the deﬁ  nition of 
“bankruptcy” in the CDS contract resulting in 
a “technical” triggering of the contracts. This 
necessitated settlement of around USD 500 billion 
in CDS contracts with losses totaling USD 25 to 
USD 40 billion. The triggering of these contracts 
poses questions on the effectiveness of CDS contracts 
in transferring risk of default.
A study by Henry Hu and Bernard Black (from the 
University of Texas) identiﬁ  ed the “empty creditor 
syndrome”.5 This is where a lender who has bought 
protection on an underlying loan, bond or credit 
exposure may have an incentive to put the reference 
entity into bankruptcy or Chapter 11 in order to be 
able to settle the contract. This may be necessary as 
the only way to trigger the CDS and capture the 
value of the credit insurance purchased.
CDS contracts might create incentives for creditors 
to push troubled companies into bankruptcy rather 
than seek to restructure debt to preserve the value of 
underlying assets. This may exacerbate losses in case 
of defaults. In fairness, ISDA’s research challenges 
the “empty creditor syndrome” on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds.6
At a minimum, the CDS market may complicate 
restructuring of distressed loans, as all lenders do not 
have the same interest in ensuring the survival of the 
ﬁ  rm. A lender with purchased protection may seek 
to use the restructuring to trigger its CDS contracts. 
CDS traders inﬂ  uenced the ﬁ  nancing or restructuring 
of VNU, the multinational media business, GUS, 
the UK retail group, and Cablecom, a Dutch 
communications company. In February 2009, the 
US unit of LyondellBasell, the world’s third-largest 
petrochemicals group that is in Chapter 11, secured 
a temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction against a group of creditors looking to 
enforce claims in a bid to trigger protection payments 
under their CDS contracts. 
Conversely, the restructuring of MBIA avoided 
triggering CDS contracts on the ﬁ  rm through the use 
of reinsurance. The MBIA restructuring entailed the 
US municipal underwriting book being reinsured by 
a new entity – National Public Finance Guarantee 
Corporation (NPFGC). Reinsurance arrangements 
with Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (FGIC) 
were then ceded to NPFGC. NPFGC also issued 
second-to-pay policies to all policyholders covered by 
the assignment giving the beneﬁ  ciaries a direct claim 
on the new entity and beneﬁ  t from the credit quality of 
the new entity (that may be superior to the pre-existing 
MBIA). All other business of MBIA including structured 
ﬁ  nance exposures remains with MBIA.
The arrangements were designed in part to avoid 
triggering the CDS contracts under the “restructuring” 
credit event. They were also designed to avoid the 
succession provisions in the CDS contract that would 
have required existing CDS contracts where MBIA 
5  See Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black (2008). 
6  See David Mengle (2009).
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was a reference entity to be split between MBIA and 
NPFGC. The effectiveness of the arrangements in 
not triggering the CDS contracts relies on highly 
technical readings of the contract.
The economic result of the arrangements is that 
MBIA retains the troubled structured ﬁ  nance 
exposures while losing the proﬁ  table and arguably 
less risky municipal re-insurance business. MBIA 
also reduces signiﬁ  cantly the amount of capital 
it has available to support the exposures that remain 
with the ﬁ  rm. 
MBIA was subsequently downgraded to non-investment 
grade. The downgrade reﬂ   ected a reduction in 
MBIA’s claim paying capacity, reduced capital, 
transfer of reserves associated with cession of it’s 
municipal portfolio and the continued deterioration 
in the insured portfolio of structured credit assets. 
This may materially increase the risk to sellers of 
protection in CDS contracts on MBIA.
The technical nature of the arrangements highlights 
the potential legal issues present in CDS contracts. 
Different legal forms of economically similar actions 
can lead to entirely different outcomes under the 
CDS contract complicating signiﬁ  cantly the effects 
of the contract and its efﬁ  cacy as a hedge.
8| OBSERVING PROTOCOLS
In 2009, the CDS “big bang” and “hardwiring” process 
codiﬁ  ed cash settlement of CDS contracts in case of 
a credit event. In cash settlement, the seller makes 
a payment to the buyer of protection intended to 
cover the loss suffered by the protection buyer 
based on the market price of a speciﬁ  c defaulted 
bond established through an “auction” system. The 
auction was designed by ISDA to be “robust” and “free 
of the risk of manipulation”. The following highlights 
some of the issues in respect of the protocol and 
auction mechanism. 
In Delphi, the protocol resulted in a settlement 
price of 63.38% (the market estimate of recovery 
by the lender). The protection buyer received 
36.62% (100%-63.38%) or USD 3.662 million per 
USD 10 million CDS contract. Fitch Ratings assigned 
a R6 recovery rating to Delphi’s senior unsecured 
obligation equating to a 0-10% recovery band - far 
below the price established through the protocol.7 
The buyer of protection depending on what was 
being hedged may have potentially received 
a payment on its hedge well below its actual losses 
– effectively it would not have been fully hedged.
Other cases highlight some of the issues in respect 
of the protocol and auction mechanism. The auction 
prices (effectively the recovery rates of the relevant 
bonds) in the settlement of CDSs on Fannie and 
Freddie were as follows:
￿ Fannie Mae – around 91.51% for senior debt and 
99.90% for subordinated debt;
￿ Freddie Mac – around 94.00% for senior debt and 
98.00 % for subordinated debt.
Holders of subordinated debt rank behind senior 
debt holders and would generally be expected to 
suffer larger losses in bankruptcy. The lower payout 
on the subordinated debt probably resulted from 
subordinated protection buyers suffering in a short 
squeeze resulting in their contracts expiring virtually 
worthless. The differences in the payouts between 
the two entities are also puzzling given the fact that 
they are both under identical “conservatorship” 
arrangements and the ultimate risk in both cases is 
the US government.
In other CDS settlements using the auction, the 
payouts required from sellers of protection have 
been highly variable and (sometimes) large relative 
to historical default loss statistics. This may reﬂ  ect 
poor economic conditions in the wake of the 
global ﬁ  nancial crisis but are more likely driven by 
technical issues related to the CDS market. 
Skewed payouts do not assist conﬁ  dence in CDS 
contracts as a mechanism for hedging. In addition, 
the large payouts may place a material pressure on 
the price of underlying bonds and loans exacerbating 
broader credit problems. For example, the relatively 
low loan CDS recovery rates around 20-30% 
(high payouts on the loan CDS) may also lead to 
further pressures on leveraged loan prices and on 
transactions, such as collateralised loan obligations 
(CLOs) based on them.
7  See James Batterman and Eric Rosenthal (2005).
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9| POST MODERN CONTRADICTIONS
In recent years, the ability to trade credit, create 
different types of credit risk to trade, the ability to 
short credit and also take highly leveraged credit bets 
has become increasingly important. To some extent 
the CDS market has detached from the underlying 
“real” credit market. If defaults rise then the high 
leverage, inherent complexity and potential loss of 
liquidity of CDS contracts and structures based on 
them may cause problems. 
The excesses of the CDS market are evident in the 
recent interest in contracts protecting against the default 
of a sovereign (known as sovereign CDSs). The specter 
of banks, some of whom have needed capital injections 
and liquidity support from governments to ensure 
their own survival, offering to insure other market 
participants against the risk of default of sovereign 
government (sometimes their own) is surreal.
The unpalatable reality that very few, self interested 
industry participants are prepared to admit is that 
much of what passed for ﬁ  nancial innovation was 
speciﬁ   cally designed to conceal risk, obfuscate 
investors and reduce transparency. The process 
was entirely deliberate. Efﬁ  ciency and transparency 
are not consistent with the high proﬁ  t margins that are 
much sought after on Wall Street. Financial products 
need to be opaque and priced inefﬁ  ciently to produce 
excessive proﬁ  ts or economic rents. Traders share 
Walter Bagehot’s views about the English monarchy: 
“We must not let daylight in upon the magic”.
In May 2006, Alan Greenspan, the former 
Chairman of the Fed, noted: “The CDS is probably 
the most important instrument in ﬁ  nance. … What 
CDS did is lay-off all the risk of highly leveraged 
institutions – and that’s what banks are, highly 
leveraged – on stable American and international 
institutions.” In October 2008, Alan Greenspan, 
the former Chairman of the Fed, acknowledged 
he was “partially” wrong to oppose regulation of 
CDSs. “Credit default swaps, I think, have serious 
problems associated with them,” he admitted to 
a Congressional hearing. This from the man who on 
30 July 1998, stated that: “Regulation of derivatives 
transactions that are privately negotiated by 
professionals is unnecessary.”
On 6 March 2009 Bloomberg  reported that 
Myron Scholes, the Nobel prize winning co-creator 
of the eponymous Black-Scholes-Merton option 
pricing model, observed that the derivative markets 
have stopped functioning and are creating problems 
in resolving the global ﬁ  nancial crisis.  Scholes was 
quoted as saying that: “ [The] solution is really to 
blow up or burn the OTC market, the CDSs and 
swaps and structured products, and … start over…”   
ISDA, the beleaguered derivatives industry group, 
predictably countered limply that: “… the notion 
that you would, as he said, blow up, the business in 
that way is just misguided.”
Ludwig von Mises, the Austrian economist from 
the early part of the twentieth century, once noted: 
“It may be expedient for a man to heat the stove 
with his furniture; but he should not delude himself 
by believing that he has discover a wonderful new 
method of heating his premises”. In a thoroughly 
post-modern contradiction, CDS contracts, originally 
intended to reduce risk, may have, in fact, 
increased risk.
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